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COMMENT
TWENTY YEARS OF MORGAN: A
CRITICISM OF THE SUBJECTIVIST
VIEW OF MENS REA AND RAPE IN
GREAT BRITAINt
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth century, modern societies have
attempted to embrace the concept of gender equality. More spe-
cifically, a rapid transformation of the perception of women in
society has occurred during the last two decades. This change
in perception has served to balance the social, economic, and
educational inequalities existing between the sexes.
The law has also attempted to embrace this concept. In its
current state, the democratic legal system is said to have
reached a point where it is gender neutral. However, there are
still areas under the law where fundamental differences in the
roles and perceptions of men and women clash and meet with
disaster. For example, the crime of rape represents an archaic
perception of the male as an aggressor and the female as a vic-
tim. However, the law regarding rape in many modern societies
is equally archaic, with the woman remaining a victim within
the criminal legal system.
Great Britain provides an illustration of this type of ineq-
uity within the law. In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Mor-
gan,' a 1975 rape case, the House of Lords confronted the issue
of what standard of mens rea applies to the crime of rape. Three
of the defendants in Morgan were accused of raping the es-
t The author would like to dedicate this article to Carol and Kenneth
Alexander.
1 2 All E.R. 347 (1975).
1
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tranged wife of an RAF officer.2 They claimed to have an honest
belief in her consent and asserted that the trial court had erred
in charging the jury that their belief in consent had to be rea-
sonable in order to constitute a valid defense. The House of
Lords ruled that a defendant accused of rape may be acquitted
even if he had an unreasonable belief in the victim's consent,
thereby discarding the reasonableness component for the mens
rea element of rape.3 This was done in clear contradiction with
most other criminal offenses which require a defense of mis-
taken belief to be reasonable. This decision, still followed today,
fails to consider that the laws need to be designed in a manner
that provides equal protection for both sexes. 4
This commentary will focus on the issues discussed in Di-
rector of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan,5 the landmark rape
case which set the precedent for the standard of mens rea6 in
Great Britain. Many legal scholars considered the decision to
be a serious digression from the previously established rights of
women as victims of sex crimes. 7 This analysis of Morgan will
2 Id. at 353. The fourth defendant, the victim's estranged husband, was not
charged with rape because of the marital rape exemption in Great Britain. Id.
3 Id. at 347. The concise holding of Morgan is as follows:
The crime of rape consisted in having sexual intercourse with a woman with
intent to do so without her consent or with indifference as to whether or not
she consented. It could not be committed if that essential mens rea were
absent. Accordingly, if an accused in fact believed that the woman con-
sented, whether or not that belief was based on reasonable grounds, he
could not be found guilty of rape.
Id.
4 For further discussion of varying perceptions of rape, consult the following:
Kristin Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women in
Legal Culture, 18 INT'L. J. Soc. L. 125 (1990); Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know;
Honoring Women in Law and Fact, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 41 (1993); W.L. Marshall
& H.E. Barbaree, A Behavioral View of Rape, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYcHIATRY 51 (1984).
5 The crime of rape is steadily growing in modern societies. A 1991 report
shows a 17% increase in rapes reported in Great Britain since 1990. Rape: the
Global Epidemic, EVENING STANDARD, February 13, 1992, at 18. In the United
States, rape has increased by 25% in the last ten years. Id. However, surveys
done by the U.S. Census Bureau, the FBI and the National Research Center esti-
mate that only 3.5% to 10% of all rapes are reported. Maureen Dowd, Rape: The
Sexual Weapon, TIME, September 5, 1993, at 27.
6 Mens rea is the mental element or state of mind that is necessary to commit
a crime. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 3.4 (2d ed.
1986).
7 See generally Zsuzanna Adler, Rape Law - the Latest Ruling, 132 NEw L. J.
746 (1982). Adler's article focuses on a related controversy occurring after Morgan
- the admissibility and relevance of the victim's past sexual experiences.
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propose that the standard for the determination of intent in
rape should center on the perceptions of both the accused and
the victim, as well as the objective evidence presented.8
II. DEVELOPMENT OF MENS REA IN THE COMMON LAW -
THE MORGAN CASE
Morgan is noteworthy after twenty years because it still re-
flects the law in Great Britain.9 The attempts to remove the
cloud over mens rea in rape by establishing a more definitive
standard have been largely unsuccessful. The use of the subjec-
tive standard of proof has garnered much criticism, and the
courts have encountered much confusion in applying the Mor-
gan holding to subsequent cases.' 0
A. Facts
Morgan, a Royal Air Force lieutenant, met three enlisted
men at a bar. 11 After spending the evening with them, Morgan
suggested that the three men come back to his house to have
intercourse with his wife.' 2 According to the men, Morgan told
them that his wife had "kinky" sexual habits and would wel-
come their advances. 13 Morgan further explained to them that
8 This standard does not appear to be necessary in cases of rape where the
attacker was a stranger to the victim. However, in situations of acquaintance
rape, date rape, family rape, and marital rape, the victim and the attacker share a
relationship with one another on some level. The author will argue that in these
situations, the perceptions of both parties as to the parameters of those relation-
ships, as well as the perceptions of the particular circumstances are crucial in de-
veloping a fair standard of mens rea in rape.
9 This decision has never been expressly overruled. However, as a result of
the controversy created by the Morgan decision, Parliament commissioned a study
to investigate the effects of the decision. See infra notes 163-87 and accompanying
text. The results of this study were later codified by Parliament in the Sexual
Offences Act of 1976. Sexual Offences Act, 1976, ch. 82, § 1 (Eng.). Although this
statute can technically be said to supercede the case law, Morgan continues to be
cited as an authority in rape law. See infra notes 231-85 and accompanying text.
10 Id.
11 Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 354. According to the facts, defendants McDonald,
McLarty, and Parker did not know Morgan prior to that night. Id. at 369. Morgan
was, however, a superior R.A.F. officer. Id. at 354.
12 Id. At the time of the incident, Morgan was estranged from his wife and
not sharing the same bed. Id.
13 Id. at 355. This was testified to by the enlisted men at trial. However,
Morgan denied the allegations. Id.
1995] 209
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his wife may appear to resist and struggle, but in reality she
was enjoying the sex act.14
The men accompanied Morgan to his house, where his wife
was asleep. 15 In the presence of their young children, Morgan
and the three men dragged Mrs. Morgan out of her bedroom by
her arms and legs.16 They proceeded to drag her into another
room with a double bed.17 Each man raped Mrs. Morgan while
the others held her down.18 Following the attack, Mrs. Morgan
went to a nearby hospital and reported that she had been
raped.1 9 Mrs. Morgan testified that she had fought off the at-
tack as best she could, but was unable to escape from the four
men.
20
The defense's case was based on the claim that Mrs. Mor-
gan had consented to the sexual activity.21 They claimed that if
Mrs. Morgan had not, in fact, consented to intercourse, they
each had a mistaken belief that she did consent.22 The trial
court instructed the jury that if Mrs. Morgan did not consent,
the defendants' beliefs that she did consent were only a defense
to the crime of rape if those beliefs were based on reasonable
grounds.23
14 Id. For a discussion of male perceptions of women within the sex act, see
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992); P.M. Mazelan, Ste-
reotypes and Perceptions of the Victims of Rape, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 121 (1980); Zindel
V. Segal and Lana Stermac, A Measure of Rapists' Attitudes Towards Women, 7
J.L. & PSYCH. 437 (1984); Bumiller, supra note 4; Henderson, supra note 4; Mar-
shall & Barbaree, supra note 4.
15 Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 354. Mrs. Morgan was sleeping on a cot in one of the
children's bedrooms at the time of the attack. Id.
16 Id. The facts of this case demonstrate a force element commonly associated
with rape. However, the issues addressed here also relate to cases of rape brought
on by circumstances of fear, fraud, and duress.
17 Id.
18 Id. Mrs. Morgan testified that the defendants held her down the entire
time. At one point when she yelled to her children to call the police, the defendants
held her nose and mouth shut until she couldn't breathe. Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 354-55. After their initial arrests, each defendant gave a statement
to the police, corroborating Mrs. Morgan's account of the events. However, the
defendants testified at trial that Mrs. Morgan was a willing participant, contrary
to their original statements. Id. at 369.
22 Id. at 349. For a summary by Lord Cross of Chelsea of the points of law
argued by the appellant and respondent, see id. at 349-52.
23 Id. at 356. The judge instructed the jury as follows:
[Vol. 7:207
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B. Treatment of Rape Before Morgan
Before the court's decision in Morgan, there was no estab-
lished case law regarding the issue of mens rea in rape.24 How-
ever, the courts in Great Britain had discussed the issue of
mens rea in other types of criminal offenses. The court had pre-
viously interpreted criminal statutes and defined standards of
mens rea for different offenses.25 In addition, the court often
debated whether a reasonably held belief could act as a defense
to a crime. 26 For most offenses, it was thought that a defend-
ant's mistaken belief could only negate the intent of his crime if
the mistake was a reasonable one.27 These issues closely paral-
lel those which were later faced by the Morgan court.
In examing the development of the law of rape, it is neces-
sary to understand the societal development of women in a his-
torical context. Many ancient societies viewed women as a type
of mother-goddess symbol.28 Women engaged in a high level of
physical autonomy during this time, as society placed a high
[Tihe prosecution have to prove that each defendant intended to have sexual
intercourse with this woman without her consent.... [T]herefore if the
defendant believed or may have believed that Mrs. Morgan consented to him
having sexual intercourse with her, then there would be no such intent in
his mind and he would not be guilty of the offence of rape, but such a belief
must be honestly held by the defendant in the first place.... And, secondly,
his belief must be a reasonable belief.
Id.
24 There were several rape cases reported in the appellate courts, but none
that dealt with the issue of requisite intent. For information on selected rape cases
preceding Morgan, see James v. Regina, 55 Cr. App. 299 (P.C. 1970) (requiring
corroborative evidence in proving absence of consent); Chiu Nang Hong v. Public
Prosecutor, 1 W.L.R. 1279 (P.C. 1964) (deciding whether miscarriage of justice oc-
curred when judge ordered conviction without corroborative evidence in rape case);
Regina v. Lang, 62 Cr. App. 50 (1975) (deciding on whether drunkenness can affect
a victim's capacity to consent); Regina v. Krausz, 57 Cr. App. 466 (1973) (relevance
of complainant's feelings about sentence on appeal); Regina v. Gunnell, 50 Cr. App.
242 (1966) (sentencing for a series of rapes and attempted rapes); Regina v.
Touhey, 45 Cr. App. 23 (1960) (discussing the alternative verdict of indecent as-
sault on a rape charge); Regina v. Cummings, 1 All E.R. 551 (C.A. 1948) (address-
ing whether or not a complaint of rape was made in a timely manner); Regina v.
O'Brien, 3 All E.R. 663 (Bristol 1974) (discussing the effect of the marital rape
exemption where alleged rape occurred after decree nisi was granted but before
the divorce decree absolute).
25 See infra notes 48-99 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 48-99 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 48-99 and accompanying text.
28 See NANCY C. GAMBLE & LEE MADiGAN, THE SECOND RAPE 11-13 (1989).
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value on traditional passages of womanhood - menstruation,
pregnancy, and childbirth.29 However, as the world began to
evolve toward a patriarchal structure, women began to lose this
status. 30
The crime of rape evolved from the early Roman law of rap-
tus, "a form of violent theft that could apply to both property
and persons."3 1 By the twelfth century, Roman law separated
crimes against persons from property crimes, defining rape as
an assault that involved "abduction, coitus, violence, and lack of
free consent on the part of the woman."32 Under Roman law,
injury was based on damages to a father, husband, or brother
because the rapist's act was said to imply that the male care-
taker was too weak or timid to protect the victim.3 3 However,
treatment of rape was based on the effect it had on men related
to the victim. Biblical references to the rape of virgins portray
it as an economic crime against property.3 4 Christian, Judeo,
and Islamic teachings each developed concepts of "female guilt,"
providing images of women as sources of sexual temptation and
distraction.3 5 Anglo-Saxon law had a similar abduction crime
not focused exclusively on rape.36
29 Id. Gamble and Madigan note that the time period referred to dates back
to the first thirty thousand years of human culture. Id. at 11.
30 Id. at 13. This transformation began approximately 3000 B.C. Id. "The
mother goddess, once a symbol of unity, was dichotomized into extremes. Women
were either idealized as the good, passive ovulating wife, rather asexual except to
bear her husband's children, or the wanton sex fiend." Id.
31 JULIA R. & HERMAN SCHWENDINGER, RAPE AND INEQUALITY 95 (1983). Rap-
tus was not considered to be a sex crime; rather, sex crimes were encompassed
under this assault law. Id.
32 Id. at 102.
33 See Dripps, supra note 14, at 1782 n.8. This exemplifies the traditional
framework of rape law. From its inception, the law sought to protect the indigni-
ties suffered by males in the situation. See Dripps, supra note 14, at 1782-83. For
further discussion of the Roman law of rape, see JANE F. GARDNER, WOMEN IN Ro-
MAN LAw AND SOCIETY 118-21 (1986). Dripps, supra note 14, at 1782 n.8.
34 Dripps, supra note 14, at 1781. Dripps cites Deuteronomy 22:22-29 as cat-
egorizing rape victims as "betrothed or unbetrothed virgins." Dripps, supra note
14, at 1781 n.5 & 6. For specific references to rape as an economic crime, see com-
ments which include actual citations. Dripps, supra note 14, at n.6.
35 See Henderson, supra note 4, at 43-45.
36 JULIA R. & HERMAN SCHWENDINGER, supra note 31, at 96-97. The law
stated that the aggressor would have to pay 50 shillings "to her owner" if a man
"carrie[sic] off a maiden." JULIA R. & HERMAN SCHWENDINGER, supra note 31, at 97
(citing THE LAwS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 63 (F.L. Attenborough ed. &
trans. 1963)).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/7
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Under early English common law, the high courts did not
prosecute the rape of women other than virgins because it did
not implicate the King's Peace.3 7 Rather, rape cases were han-
dled by local feudal courts or avenged privately.38 English com-
mon law also allowed for a rape conviction to be nullified if the
victim agreed to wed the rapist.39
By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most English
women accepted rape as one of many indignities they endured,
like domestic violence.40 Feminist scholars maintain that the
definition of rape was constructed "by men and for men."
41
While women viewed rape in terms of lack of consent and physi-
cal pain, men viewed rape as a crime only if the victim was con-
sidered to be chaste.42 Sir Matthew Hale, in speaking about
rape, once stated that "it must be remembered that it is an ac-
cusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to
be defended by the party accused, tho[sicl never so innocent."43
In addition to perceptions of this nature, rape complainants had
to contend with a corroboration requirement and public scru-
37 Dripps, supra note 14, at 1782. The failure to consider rape as a crime
against society reflects the position of women as second class citizens both in soci-
ety and under the law.
38 Dripps, supra note 14, at 1782.
39 Dripps, supra note 14, at 1782. The author asserts that marrying the rap-
ist would relieve the victim's family of "damaged goods." Dripps, supra note 14, at
1782 (citing 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWs AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 417-18 (George E.
Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968)).
40 See ANNA CLARY, WOMEN'S SILENCE AND MEN'S VIOLENCE: SEXUAL ASSAULT
IN ENGLAND 1770-1845, at 28 (1987). But Clark comments:
[N]o matter how a woman regarded her sexuality, rape was a traumatic ex-
perience. If a woman prized her chastity as essential for marriage, a rapist
ruined her. If she regarded her sexuality as a source of her own pleasure,
the rapist violated her right to desire or refuse. If she sold her sexuality for
subsistence, rape was still an unexpected, violent assault.
Id.
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id. at 23. Once a woman was violated, society would regard her as dam-
aged property. Id. at 21. in addition, husbands of rape victims sometimes used
the attack as a justification for divorce. Id. at 29. Rape attacks were discounted to
the point that reported rape cases were often republished as fantasy stories for
men in the upper echelons of English society. Id. at 35.
43 Susan Edwards, Sexuality, Sexual Offenses and Conceptions of Victims in
the Criminal Justice Process, 8 VICTmOLOGY 113, 118 (1983) (citing M. HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 636 (1971)).
1995]
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tiny when attempting to prosecute. 44 Further, the victim had to
fight a constant battle of credibility. 45
The evolution of English common law slowly began to rec-
ognize a different perception of rape. While the focus of the in-
jury began to center on a woman's physical autonomy,46 there
was little treatment of the state of mind needed to commit rape.
Rape cases dating back before Morgan fail to address this issue.
However, in order to evaluate the decision in Morgan, it is nec-
essary to see how the issue of determining mens rea was treated
with respect to other criminal offenses. The following section
provides an overview of cases predating Morgan which address
mens rea as it relates to various criminal offenses.47 This stan-
dard is later rejected by the House of Lords in Morgan.
1. Regina v. Tolson48
This case was instrumental in establishing the principle of
allowing a reasonably held mistaken belief as a defense to cer-
tain crimes. In Tolson, the defendant had remarried while still
legally married to her first husband, and was convicted of big-
amy. 49 The statute read that "whoever being married shall
marry any other person during the life of the former wife or
husband shall be guilty of a felony .... -50 While the defendant's
actions clearly came within the words of the statute, she
claimed that she was not guilty because she believed that her
first husband was dead.51
On appeal, the House of Lords overturned the conviction.
Based on the evidence presented, the court found that the de-
44 See id. at 118-19.
45 See id. at 118-20. Edwards maintains that from 1817 to 1976, criminal pro-
cedure laws allowed a victim's sexual activities with other men as evidence of cred-
ibility. Id.
46 This is shown in recent trends in rape law reform. In the United States,
some state legislatures have revised the rules of evidence and criminal procedure,
seeking to exclude evidence of past sexual history and the "abolition of the corrobo-
ration and resistance requirements." See Dripps supra note 14, at 1783 (citing
Leigh Bienen, Rape III - National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 Wo-
MEN'S RTS. L. REP. 170, 181-82, 197-200 (1980)).
47 It is important to consider the following cases in light of the fact that no
English case defining the standard of mens rea in rape existed before Morgan.
48 58 L.J.R. 97 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1889).
49 Id.
5O Id.
51 Id.
[Vol. 7:207
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fendant did, in fact, manifest a belief in the death of her first
husband.5 2 Further, the objective evidence showed that this be-
lief was based on reasonable grounds.5 3 Since the defendant's
actions would have been innocent if the circumstances were as
she believed them to be, the court held that the defendant did
not have the requisite intent to commit the offense.54
2. Regina v. Chisam55
The defendant in this case awoke after he heard a group of
people making loud noises outside his house.5 6 Following a ver-
bal altercation, the defendant fired two shots outside. 57 The an-
gry mob retaliated by breaking into the defendant's home.58
The defendant armed himself with a stick and approached the
group.5 9 He had wounded one of the men with the gunshots,
and later killed him in a struggle inside the house.60 Chisam
was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to life
imprisonment.61
In appealing the conviction, the defendant claimed that the
shots were random and his actions were in self-defense.6 2
Chisam's defense raised two questions: First, did the defendant
have an honest belief that he and his family were in danger?
Second, if so, was this belief based on reasonable grounds?6 3
The defense claimed Chisam's conviction should be overturned
on the ground that the jury was not instructed by the trial court
judge to determine whether his belief was reasonable. 64
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the defendant's
argument that an honest belief based on reasonable grounds
52 See id. at 99.
53 See id.
54 Id.
55 47 Crim. App. 130 (1963).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 131.
60 Id. at 130-31.
61 Id. at 130.
62 Id. at 132. Chisam maintained that he was in fear that his safety and the
safety of his family were in jeopardy. Id. at 134.
63 Id. at 133.
64 Id.
1995]
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can constitute a defense to murder.65 In the development of
British criminal law, it was well recognized that to plead self-
defense, "[there must be a reasonable necessity for the killing,
or at least an honest belief based upon reasonable grounds that
there is such a necessity."66 It was not necessary for the jury to
believe that the defendant's life was in danger. Rather, the jury
must find the defendant had a reasonable belief that, under the
circumstances, his life was in danger. 67 The court reaffirmed
the principle outlined in Tolson that this belief must be based
on reasonable grounds in order to act as a defense. 68
3. Regina v. Gould69
In Gould, the court decided the possible negation of mens
rea in a bigamy case. 70 Defendant was married in 1959, and
began divorce proceedings a few years later.71 During the di-
vorce process, the defendant spent one year in jail.72 When he
was released, the couple had a brief period of reconciliation
which ended within a few weeks. 73 The defendant remarried
later that year, and was subsequently charged with bigamy. 74
Without the advice of counsel, he plead guilty to the charge. 75
Later, he petitioned the court to retract his guilty plea and
quash his conviction on the ground that he had a valid de-
fense.76 The defendant testified that when he was released
from prison, his wife told him their divorce proceedings were
completed. 77 He claimed he was not guilty of bigamy because
65 Id. Although the court agreed that the trial court judge failed to instruct
the jury as to reasonableness, it upheld the conviction. Because the trial jury
found that the defendant was not acting on an honest belief, the court held that the
question of reasonableness was moot. Therefore, the trial court judge's mistake
was harmless error. See generally id. at 134.
66 Id. at 133 (quoting 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 721 (3d ed.)).
67 Id. at 134.
68 See id. at 133-34.
69 1 All E.R. 849 (C.A. 1968).
70 Id. at 850.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
216 [Vol. 7:207
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he honestly and reasonably believed that he was divorced from
his first wife at the time of his second marriage. 78
In their decision, the court supported the defendant's con-
tention by holding the defense to be valid and quashing the con-
viction. 79 The statute was silent as to the degree of intent
necessary to be found guilty of bigamy.80 The court had to in-
terpret the existing bigamy statute and decide whether to read
in some degree of mens rea. Their decision answered the ques-
tion of whether or not bigamy was an absolute offense.8 ' They
held that the statute should be interpreted loosely to include
some degree of mens rea.8 2 Further, the court extended the
principle that an honest and reasonably held belief could act to
negate the mens rea necessary to be convicted of bigamy. 83
4. Sweet v. Parsley4
In this case, the defendant appealed a drug conviction
stemming from the discovery of marijuana in a house which she
rented to others.8 5 She claimed that she had no knowledge of
the tenant's drug use and should not be convicted under the
statute.8 6
The House of Lords reversed the conviction because, like in
Gould, the statute did not specifically delineate a standard of
mens rea. In this situation, the court determined it was their
province to read a standard of mens rea into the statute.8 7
78 Id.
79 Id. at 849.
80 Id. at 851. The relevant portion of Section 57 of the 1861 Offences Against
the Person Act is discussed in Lord Diplock's opinion. Id. at 851-52.
81 Id. at 851-53. This case parallels Morgan in many respects. Here, the
court was forced to construe the meaning of the bigamy statute and determine a
standard of mens rea. The court would later be called on to do the same with the
rape statute in Morgan. Once again, this is different from strict liability, where
there is no mens rea element at all. Here, the prosecution is asserting that the
only mens rea needed to be proven is that the act was intentional.
82 Id. at 852. In situations where there was no clear legislative desire to de-
clare a requisite degree of intent for a particular offense, courts were generally
inclined to put one in where it did not exist. Their decisions appeared to be guided
by their determinations of general principles of equity.
83 Id. at 853.
84 1 All E.R. 347 (1969).
85 Id. at 349.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 352. The statute at issue here was Section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1965. The House of Lords had to interpret the act because there was no
1995]
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Here, the court found that under the statute, a landlord had to
know of the drug use in order to be convicted.88 The defendant
claimed she did not know about the activities that went on in
the house.8 9 Based on the evidence, the court found her belief to
be honest and reasonable. The court found it to be valid defense
to the charges of drug use and possession. 90
Existing rape law was similar because there was no specific
standard of mens rea.91 It is unclear as to what standard of
mens rea existed because it had previously been left to the
court's discretion. Prior to Morgan, however, the requirement
of reasonableness in asserting a mistaken belief as a defense to
a crime was never in question. For this defense to be valid, the
jury had to find that the defendant's belief was an honest one.
Once this was ascertained, the jury had to find the defendant's
belief to be reasonable.
5. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith92
Defendant Smith was stopped at a traffic checkpoint when
police saw stolen goods in the back of his car. When police
asked the defendant to get out of the car, he sped off. The officer
chased the car, hanging on as it accelerated. As the car was
swerving, the police officer fell off and received fatal injuries.
As a result, Smith was charged and subsequently convicted of
capital murder.93
apparent standard of mens rea. Id. at 35. Again, this provides a parallel for what
the court would do in Morgan.
88 Id. at 351-52.
89 Id. at 349.
90 Id. at 354.
91 The Sexual Offences Act of 1956 stated that "it is a felony for a man to rape
a woman." Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 Eliz. 2, ch. 69, § 1 (Eng.). It gave no fur-
ther instruction as to requisite intent.
92 3 All E.R. 161 (1960).
93 At trial, the defendant made the following contentions:
(i) That he did not realise the officer was hanging on to the car until the
officer fell off and that he could not keep a straight course having regard to
the weight of the metal in the back. In other words, he raised the defense of
accident.
(ii) Alternatively, that it was a case of manslaughter and not murder in that
he had no intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm.
Id. at 165.
[Vol. 7:207
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The trial judge instructed the jury to compare the actions of
the defendant against those of a reasonable man.94 If they were
satisfied the defendant, as a reasonable man, must have con-
templated the harm that would come to the police officer, then
they should find him guilty of capital murder.95 The defendant
appealed on this basis, claiming the judge's directions should
have focused on what he himself intended.96
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding the trial
judge misdirected the jury on the issue of intent.97 The ques-
tion was certified to the House of Lords, who declared that the
objective method of determining mens rea was correctly used by
the trial court.98 The court reasoned that "the danger which in
that fact exists under the known circumstances ought to be of a
class which a man of reasonable prudence could foresee. Igno-
rance of a fact and inability to foresee a consequence have the
same effect on blameworthiness." 99
C. Background of Mens Rea
The term mens rea is a Latin phrase meaning "guilty
mind."100 To understand why mens rea is important in deter-
mining criminal liability, it is necessary to discuss a larger
94 Id. at 166.
95 Id.
96 Id.
The main complaint is that the learned judge was there applying what is
referred to as an objective test, namely, the test of what a reasonable man
would contemplate as the probable result of his acts, and, therefore, would
intend, whereas the question for the jury, it is said, was what the respon-
dent himself intended.
Id.
97 Id. The first issue raised by the defendant, that it was an accident, was not
raised on appeal. Id. However, the Court of Appeal did agree with the defendant
that a purely subjective standard should be used to evaluate mens rea. Id. at 166-
67.
98 Id. at 167. The court explained that the objective test was well settled in
general principles of criminal law. See id.
99 Id. (quoting 0LVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 53 (1945)). Vis-
count Kilmuir also explained that use of the term "reasonable man" here should
not be confused with its use as the standard of care in civil cases. Rather, he
stated that "it really denotes an ordinary man capable of reasoning who is respon-
sible and accountable for his actions, and this is the sense in which it would be
understood by a jury." Id.
100 BLAces LAw DICTioNARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
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question. Why does society punish?' 01 There are several plau-
sible reasons. Punishment can serve to deter further crime, to
rehabilitate the offender, to act as retribution, or to give the vic-
tim justice and peace of mind. The significance of a guilty mind
in the commission of a crime depends on what society's goals
are in punishing the offender.' 0 2
Generally, the commission of a crime requires two distinct
elements: a physical act and a mental act.10 3 Mens rea refers to
the mental act or state of mind that is required.10 4 Most of-
fenses are codified by statutes. Within the statute there is usu-
ally some explanation of the type of intent that a person must
have in order to commit that offense.' 0 5
There are four basic types of crimes which are delineated
by the requisite mental state:10 6 (1) crimes that require inten-
tion or purpose to do an act or cause a result; 10 7 (2) crimes that
require knowledge of the nature of the act, knowledge of the
result, or knowledge of the attendant circumstances;10 8 (3)
crimes that require recklessness in doing the act or causing the
101 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScOTr, supra note 6.
102 CHARLEs E. TORCiA, WHARTON'S CRIMNAL LAw (14th ed. 1978). Wharton
cites retribution, deterrence and reformation as purposes of the criminal law. In
explaining the functions of the criminal law, Wharton says the following:
(1) It defines conduct which is deemed sufficiently injurious to the interests
of the individual or community to warrant the protection of a criminal law.
The anti-social conduct which is punishable as a crime may, but need not, be
immoral. But not all immoral conduct is punishable as a crime. (2) It pro-
vides a punishment for the criminal conduct, geared primarily to the gravity
of the offense, yet broad enough in latitude to accommodate the characteris-
tics of individual offenders.
Id. at § 1.
103 See generally LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 6. The requirements under the
mental component vary, depending upon the criminal act.
104 LAFAVE & Sco7T, supra note 6.
105 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 6.
106 There are the four general categories of mens rea as outlined by the Model
Penal Code, § 2.02(2), reviewed by LAFAvE & ScoT, supra note 6. The Model Pe-
nal Code also addresses strict liability crimes. A discussion of strict liability
crimes is not necessary for the scope of this argument.
107 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 6. For crimes that require purpose or intent,
the actor must set out to complete the required act to produce the resulting
consequences.
108 LAFAVE & ScoT, supra note 6. Under this standard, an actor must under-
stand the act he is committing and be aware of the potential consequences.
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result;10 9 and (4) crimes that require only negligence in doing
an act or causing a result. 110
However, difficulties arise in trying to determine the requi-
site mens rea for an offense. Even though most statutes offer a
standard such as "negligently," "recklessly," or "knowingly,"
these words are ambiguous and subject to interpretation."1 ' It
becomes even more difficult if the statute does not provide a
standard, or if there is no statute to codify an offense. More
importantly, once a standard for mens rea is established, it be-
comes necessary to delineate whether to enforce that standard
on objective or subjective grounds.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary" 2 explains
that "subjective" is characteristic of a reality perceived in the
mind, as opposed to an actual independent reality.113 A subjec-
tive standard of reviewing a person's intent focuses on what the
perceptions are in that person's mind and how that person
views the circumstances of a particular situation. Using a sub-
jective standard, fault may only be assigned when it can be
shown that the actor, in his own mind, realized the risk that his
conduct involved. 114
In contrast, an objective standard focuses on evidence in-
dependent of the actor's thought."15 It views the facts for what
they are, rather than what the actor perceived them to be.
Moreover, the objective approach evaluates those facts based on
what is considered reasonable by current societal standards.
109 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 6. When an actor is reckless, he either disre-
gards the hazards of the act itself and the consequences in committing a particular
act or does not realize or care what they may be.
110 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 6. For crimes that have a negligence stan-
dard, the actor must fail to conduct himself in the manner of a reasonably prudent
person.
111 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 6.
112 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1976).
113 Id. at 2275.
114 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 6. This is contrasted with an objective stan-
dard which focuses on evidence independent of the actor's thought.
115 See M.R. Goode, Mens Rea in Corpore Reo: An Exploration of the Rapist's
Charter, 7 DALHOusiE L.J. 447 (1983); Richard Townshend-Smith, Objective Lia-
bility Reasserted, 126 SoLicrroR's J. 738 (1982).
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III. AN EXPLANATION OF MfENS R E IN RAPE: MORGAN
A. Holding of Morgan
The trial court instructed the jury as to the general princi-
ple of mistaken belief as a defense. 116 The judge stated that for
the defendants' belief to constitute a valid defense, it must sat-
isfy two considerations. First, the belief must be found to be
honest; second, the belief must be found to be based on reason-
able grounds. 117
The defendants were subsequently convicted and appealed
to the House of Lords."18 The issue on appeal centered around
the "reasonableness" prong of the defense outlined by the trial
court. 1 9 The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the House
of Lords as follows: "[wihether, in rape, the defendant can prop-
erly be convicted, notwithstanding that he in fact believed that
the woman consented if such belief was not based on reasonable
grounds."120
The focus was whether a defendant's unreasonable belief in
consent to sexual intercourse could act to acquit him.' 2' The
defendants and the state argued differing definitions of rape
and mental culpability. The defense claimed that in order to
satisfy the mental element in rape, the accused must be "either
aware that she was not consenting or did not care whether or
not she consented." 22 Since the state could not bring forth pos-
itive evidence of the defendant's state of mind, the defense as-
serted the state should present evidence to show the victim did
116 Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 356.
117 Id. In explaining the concept of reasonable belief, the trial judge stated
that it is "such a belief as a reasonable man would entertain if he applied his mind
and thought about the matter. It is not enough for a defendant to rely upon a
belief, even though he honestly held it, if it was completely fanciful...." Id.
118 Id. at 349. The Court of Appeals, Criminal Division, dismissed the initial
appeals. Id. However, the case was successfully appealed to the House of Lords
because "the decision involved a point of law of general public importance." Id.
119 Id. at 354.
120 Id. A second issue that the Lords had to consider was conditioned on the
outcome of this. If they found that the trial judge had misdirected the jury on
reasonableness, they had to decide whether to uphold the conviction on the
grounds that no miscarriage of justice resulted. Id. at 349.
121 Id. at 349-53. A related issue disputed by both sides was the evidentiary
burden of proving intent. See id. at 350-53.
122 Id. at 349.
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not consent. 123 The defendant then has the option to offer evi-
dence that he believed that the victim was consenting and evi-
dence of his reasons for that belief.124 The defense further
stated the evidentiary burden of the accused's belief in consent
should be on the state at all times. 125
Conversely, the state maintained the only standard re-
quired to satisfy the mens rea element in rape is that the inter-
course be intentional. 126 Once the state satisfied its burden of
establishing "evidence of intercourse and lack of consent, . . . it
is open to the defendant on general principles of criminal liabil-
ity.., to raise the defense that he had reasonable grounds for
believing that the woman was consenting... ."127 If this defense
is raised, the judge must then decide whether evidence of the
defendant's belief is sufficient to be put in front of the jury. 128 If
the evidence of belief is put to the jury, the burden should then
shift back to the state to show the jury that the defendant either
had no such belief, or that he had no reasonable grounds for
it.129
By a three to two majority,130 the House of Lords reversed
in part the decision of the trial court.131 While the convictions
123 Id. at 349-50. The defense asserted that evidence of the victim's lack of
consent would cause the jury to draw an inference that the defendant was aware
that she was not consenting. Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 350. The defense claimed that the issue of a defendant's belief in
consent was one that should be in front of the jury at all times. While they main-
tained that the prosecution did not have to "adduce positive evidence of the defend-
ant's state of mind," they claimed that the burden of proving this issue should be
on the prosecution at all times. Id. at 349-50.
126 Id. The prosecution never asserted that rape should be a strict liability
type of crime. Their contention was that they did not need to prove any specific
mens rea; rather, the proof of the commission of the act was sufficient to make a
primary showing of intent. Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. In contrast to the defense, the prosecution contended that the defend-
ant's belief was not an issue to be in front of the jury at all times. Instead, it
should only be considered by the jury if the judge determines that the defense is
sufficient. Id.
129 Id. The prosecution viewed the issue of reasonable belief strictly as a de-
fense to the commission of an intentional act.
130 Lords Cross, Hailsham, and Fraser composed the majority.
131 The exact holding of Morgan is as follows:
(i) (Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Edmund-Davies dissenting) The
crime of rape consisted in having sexual intercourse with a woman with in-
tent to do so without her consent or with indifference as to whether or not
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remained intact, the court found an honest belief in consent
could act to negate the mens rea element in rape, regardless of
whether that belief was reasonable or unreasonable. 13 2 The
court rejected the mistaken belief defense that had been em-
ployed in numerous other cases for several reasons.' 33
First, the court examined the existing rape statute. The
Sexual Offences Act of 1956 was the first codification of the
crime of rape.1'4 It stated, "it is a felony for a man to rape a
woman." 35 Without any further discussion of mens" rea, the
court had to decide what degree of intent to read into the
statute.' 36
Second, the court had to formulate a definition of rape. The
state contended that rape occurs when the victim does not, in
fact, consent to intercourse. 37 This definition characterizes
rape as an absolute offense,' 38 similar to the bigamy offense dis-
cussed in Tolson and Gould.'3 9 Under this definition, the only
intent necessary to be proven is that the intercourse is inten-
tional. 140 When an offense is determined to be absolute, the
courts have generally applied the principle that an honestly
held belief based on reasonable grounds can constitute a de-
fense to the crime. 141
she consented. It could not be committed if that essential mens rea were
absent. Accordingly, if an accused in fact believed that the woman had con-
sented, whether or not that belief was based on reasonable grounds, he
could not be found guilty of rape ....
(ii) In the light of all the evidence, however, no reasonable jury could have
failed to convict the appellants even if the jury had been properly directed.
Accordingly, despite the misdirection, there had been no miscarriage of jus-
tice in respect of any of the appellants; the appeals would therefore be dis-
missed under the proviso to s 2(1) of the Criminal Act 1968.
Id. at 347.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 347-62, 379-83. While each judge authors his own opinion, the most
detailed majority opinion was written by Lord Hailsham.
134 Sexual Offences Act, 1956, 4 Eliz. 2, ch. 69, § 1 (Eng.).
135 Id.
136 Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 353-62. Note that in defining rape and delineating a
requisite mens rea, Lord Cross is exclusively concerned with how a male, or more
particularly, an accused, would define rape. There is no discussion of how a victim
would view rape. Id. at 352.
137 Id. at 350.
138 Id. at 364-65 and supra note 81.
139 See supra notes 45-51, 66-80 and accompanying text.
140 Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 364-65.
141 See id. at 370-80 (Edmund-Davies, L., dissenting).
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The defendants maintained that rape occurs when a person
intends to have intercourse with another who is not con-
senting. 142 Here, the intent goes beyond contemplation of the
act itself;143 the defendant must not only think about the act of
intercourse, but intend to continue the act, despite knowing the
victim does not consent. 44 Therefore, an affirmative defense in
this situation is not necessary. 45 Either the prosecution brings
forth enough evidence to show the defendant's intent, or there
must be an acquittal.146
The House of Lords examined the element of mens rea
under both definitions.147 The opposing views were synthesized
and evaluated in the following manner: "[i]f the words defining
an offence provide either expressly or impliedly that a man is
not to be guilty"148 and if he believes something to be true, then
he is not guilty "if the jury think that he may have believed it to
be true, however inadequate were his reasons for doing so." 49
Alternately, if the words define the offense as absolute, a de-
fense of mistaken belief must be reasonable. 150 The House of
Lords rejected the state's absolute definition and found the of-
fense of rape required some type of specific intent. 15 ' The court
framed its definition in the following context:
[T]o the question whether a man, who has intercourse with a wo-
man believing on inadequate grounds that she is consenting to it,
though she is not, commits rape, I think he would reply, 'No.' If
he was grossly careless then he may deserve to be punished but
not for rape.' 52
Lord Cross of Chelsea stated, "[rape, to my mind, imports
at least indifference as to the woman's consent ... [t]hat being
my view as to the meaning of the word 'rape' in ordinary par-
lance, I next ask myself whether the law gives it a different
142 Id. at 358.
143 Id.
144 See id. at 349.
145 See id. at 357.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 356-67.
148 Id. at 352.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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meaning."153 The court found that there was little existing law
that contradicted the definition given by Lord Cross, and used a
common language definition of rape in its decision.1 54
Because the court did not find rape to be an absolute of-
fense, it held that a belief in consent did not necessarily have to
be based on reasonable grounds. 5 5 To support this, Lord Hail-
sham of St. Marylebone stated:
A failure to prove this involves an acquittal because the intent, an
essential ingredient, is lacking. It matters not why it is lacking if
only it is not there, and in particular it matters not that the inten-
tion is lacking only because of a belief not based on reasonable
grounds.15 6
The majority held the two part instruction that the trial
court gave to the jury was not necessary.1 57 They found if a be-
lief is honest, it does not matter whether its basis is reasonable
or unreasonable.1 5 8 The court determined that the formula for
determining whether a defense is valid is honesty, not honesty
plus reasonableness.' 59 The court asserted that a requirement
of reasonableness could act to impose an intent on a defendant
where it might not exist.' 60 In support of this contention, Lord
Hailsham of St. Marylebone argued:
I believe that 'mens rea' means 'guilty or criminal mind', and if it
be the case, as seems to be accepted here, that the mental element
in rape is not knowledge but intent, to insist that a belief must be
reasonable to excuse it is to insist that either the accused is to be
found guilty of intending to do that which in truth he did not in-
tend to do, or that his state of mind, though innocent of evil in-
tent, can convict him if it be honest but not rational.16 '
153 Id.
154 See generally id. at 352-62.
155 Id. at 362.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 356. Lord Hailsham commented, "the crux of the matter, the factum
probandum, or rather the fact to be refuted by the prosecution, is honesty and not
honesty plus reasonableness. In making reasonableness as well as honesty an in-
gredient in this 'defence' the judge, say the appellants, was guilty of a misdirec-
tion." Id. The majority agreed.
'58 Id. at 362.
159 See id. at 353-61 (Lord Hailsham's opinion).
160 Id. at 352.
161 Id. at 357 (quoting Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [19351
A.C. 462, [1935] All E.R. 1).
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Based on this standard, the House of Lords upheld the con-
victions of the defendants. 162 The court reasoned that it would
have been impossible for the jury to find that the defendants
honestly believed that Mrs. Morgan was consenting to sexual
intercourse. 163 Since the court determined that there could not
have been an honestly held belief to begin with, it held that the
trial court instruction that the belief must be based on reason-
able grounds only constituted harmless error. 164 The trial
court's instruction did not prejudice the outcome of the trial,
and the court dismissed the appeals accordingly. 165
B. The Heilbron Report and Statutory Definition
The Morgan decision created a frenzy of outrage both inside
and outside Great Britain. 166 A legislative committee was im-
mediately formed to assess the decision and to decide what
action should be taken.167 In making this evaluation, the com-
mittee's task was to view statistical reports on rape, examine
the societal attitudes toward rape, and study the effects of rape
on society.168 The committee report, known as the Heilbron Re-
port, agreed with the Morgan decision and made two specific
recommendations:1 69
162 See id. at 353, 362, 383.
163 See id. at 353-62.
164 Id.
165 See id at 353, 362, 383.
166 Victoria J. Dettmar, Culpable Mistakes in Rape: Eliminating the Defense of
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as to Victim Consent, 89 DicK L. Rav. 473, 491
(1989).
167 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON THE LAW OF RAPE, 1976, CMND 6352
[hereinafter HEILBRON REPORT]. "This inquiry originated as a result of the wide-
spread concern expressed by the public, the media and in Parliament in regard to
the decision of the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan &
Others." Id. at 1.
168 Id. The Heilbron Report also dealt with other aspects of the rape issue:
mens rea and drunkenness, protecting victim identity, evidence of past sexual his-
tory, and the possibility of creating a lesser offense.
169 In addition to the recommendations which centered around Morgan, the
Committee also made the following findings: that alleged victims should remain
anonymous and the reporting of a victim[s] identity should be a crime; that evi-
dence of a victim's past sexual history should be limited to cross-examination
about relations with the accused; and that rape trial juries should have at least
four members of both sexes. Rape: Heilbron Draws a Veil, THE ECONOMIST, De-
cember 13, 1975, at 32.
1995] 227
21
PACE INT'L L. REV.
First, the Morgan court's conclusion that recklessness re-
garding consent is the mens rea required to support a rape con-
viction must be codified in order to prevent the rationale from
being dismissed as dicta.170 Second, a means by which a jury in
a rape case determines whether the defendant honestly be-
lieved that the woman consented should be developed. 171
In coming to the above conclusions, the Heilbron Commit-
tee first looked at the crime of rape itself. It acknowledged that
there was no modern definition of rape, despite its listing as an
offense under the Sexual Offences Act of 1956.172 Finding ambi-
guity in the existing definition, the Committee focused on four
areas in an attempt to clarify the crime of rape.
First, the Committee stated that rape should center around
a lack of consent, rather than the use of force. 173 Next, it found
the actus reus in rape to consist of "(a) unlawful sexual inter-
course and (b) absence of the woman's consent."174 Then, it de-
fined the mens rea as "an intention by the defendant to have
sexual intercourse.. . either knowing that she does not consent,
or recklessly not caring whether she consents or not."175 Fi-
nally, the Committee declared that when a defendant contends
that he mistakenly believed in the woman's consent, he is not
bringing forth a defense to the crime; rather, he is arguing that
the prosecution has failed to meet the mens rea element of the
offense. 176
170 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 14; see Dettmar, supra note 166, at
492. Note that in the 1976 codification, there is a slight nuance. Part (2) explains
that a jury is to have regard for the presence or absence of reasonable belief; at
first this seems inconsistent with the holding in Morgan. However, this section
deals with the evidence given to the jury; it does not address whether or not this
evidence can be a defense to guilt.
171 Dettmar, supra note 166, at 492. Parliament used the Morgan decision as
its model and basis for authority in drafting Great Britain's modern definition of
the crime of rape.
172 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 3. The Committee noted that the
traditional common law definition of rape still in use was derived from a 17th cen-
tury writing by Nathan Hale. "[Riape consists in having unlawful sexual inter-
course with a woman without her consent, by force, fear or fraud." HEILBRON
REPORT, supra note 167, at 3.
173 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 3.
174 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 3.
175 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 3. The Committee also noted that the
burden is on the prosecution to establish both the actus reus and mens rea ele-
ments of the crime.
176 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 4.
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The Committee then examined the Morgan case itself. Af-
ter reviewing the facts of the case, it briefly discussed the his-
torical background preceding Morgan. 77 The Committee
asserted that Morgan should be viewed under the light of fun-
damental principles of criminal law.178 The principle focused
on in particular was "that a man must be morally blameworthy
before he can be found guilty of a crime - that is to say he must
have meant to do what the law forbids or been reckless in not
caring whether he did it or not."' 79 From this, the Committee
evaluated the subjective and objective methods for determining
the accused's intent.'80 It immediately rejected the objective
approach, citing Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith.','
After reaching its conclusion that the subjective approach
should be the method used to determine the existence of mens
rea, the Heilbron Committee addressed what it felt was the
main issue in Morgan: "Whose mind must be guilty? The mind
of the defendant or that of a hypothetical reasonable man?" 8 2
177 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 7-8.
178 The Committee proclaimed that these were concepts "which have been
shaped and refined over centuries by Parliament and the Courts to accord with the
changing moral standards of society." HEILBRON REPORT, SUPra note 167, at 7.
179 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 7. The Committee maintained that
the principle of man being criminally culpable for acts or omissions that were acci-
dental or unintentional is archaic and outdated, and should only exist today in
traditional strict liability crimes. HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 8.
180 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 8-9.
181 3 All E.R. 161 (1960). This case involved the death of a police officer and
the issue of whether or not a person could be convicted of murder if he did not
intend serious bodily injury. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. The
Committee criticized the Smith decision, claiming that intent should have been
determined by what was in the mind of the accused, rather than by "the intention
of a purely hypothetical reasonable man." HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 8.
The Committee maintained that section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967 was
enacted in response to Smith. It provides that:
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence -
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of
his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of
those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to
all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear
proper in the circumstances.
Criminal Justice Act, 1967, ch. 80, § 8 (Eng.). The Committee uses this as author-
ity for a subjective approach to mens rea and hail it as a "landmark in the develop-
ment of the criminal law with its concern for the liberty of the subject." HEIELBRON
REPORT, supra note 167, at 9.
182 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 9.
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In answering this question, the Committee used circular rea-
soning which closely paralleled the majority in Morgan.183 It
found a mistaken belief, albeit erroneous, negatives the requi-
site mens rea for rape. Conversely, a jury's belief that the
accused either knew or was reckless as to lack of consent nega-
tives the existence of any mistake on the part of the accused.18 4
Finally, the Heilbron Report addressed the issue of
whether or not a mistaken belief in consent had to be based on
reasonable grounds.18 5 In rejecting this requirement, the report
cited the following reasons: a genuine mistake alone negates
mens rea; juries with a "strong sense of fairness" may hesitate
to convict where there was no deliberate or reckless violation;
and that the imprecise and varied nature of sexual relation-
ships would make it difficult for a jury to articulate a reasonable
man standard.18 6 The overall findings in the report supported
the majority decision in Morgan. Further, the report defended
the majority by attempting to answer various criticisms of the
case.18 7 The Heilbron Report cautioned that those concerned
with the standards involved in rape law should be concerned
with criminal culpability of the accused and the deprivation of
his liberty, rather than the harm inflicted. 8 8
's3 See Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 352, 357.
184 Id.
185 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 9-10. The report cited the argument
supporting the reasonableness requirement as follows: "it is said that this addi-
tional requirement is necessary because women should be protected from the care-
lessness or negligence of men in ascertaining their wishes, and that if the conduct
of the accused fell short of the standard of a reasonable man, he should be found
guilty of rape." HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 10.
186 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 10. The Committee also noted that
its additional propositions regarding procedural and evidentiary changes might
convince some critics to abandon their arguments for a negligence standard of
mens rea and an objective standard of determination. HEILBRON REPORT, supra
note 167, at 10.
187 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 10-11. For example, the Committee
asserted that the Morgan decision did not stand for the proposition that a person
was entitled to be acquitted, "no matter how ridiculous his story might be." HEiL-
BRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 11. Further, it maintained that the reasonable-
ness was not irrelevant; rather, it is part of the evidence which the jury may choose
to accept or not accept. HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 11.
188 HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 12.
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As a result of the Heilbron Report, Morgan's common law
decision was codified in the Sexual Offences Act of 1976, section
1,189 which defined rape in the following manner:
(1) A man commits rape if (a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse
with a woman who at the time does not consent to it; and (b) at
the time he knows that she does not consent to the intercourse or
he is reckless as to whether she consents to it...
(2) It is hereby declared that if at a trial for a rape offence the
jury has to consider whether a man believed that a woman was
consenting to sexual intercourse, the presence or absence of rea-
sonable grounds for such a belief is a matter to which the jury is
to have regard, in conjunction with any other relevant matters, in
considering whether he so believed. 190
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Controversy in Morgan
The Morgan decision is controversial in three respects.
First, it established a subjective standard for proving the exist-
ence or absence of the intent to commit the offense of rape, re-
gardless of the objective evidence.191 A subjective standard of
proof relies on what is going on inside the defendant's mind,
rather than the actual reality of the circumstances. Although
the legal system does not want to punish a person who does not
have a guilty mind, the subjective standard of proof often ig-
nores the fact that a crime has been committed. Every crime
has a victim, and the subjective standard fails to encompass the
victim's perceptions and right to justice.
Second, it categorized rape as a specific intent crime, mak-
ing the standard of proof much higher than what would be nec-
essary to prove a general intent. 192 Specific intent generally
designates a ". . . special mental element which is required
189 Sexual Offences Act, 1976, ch. 82, § 1 (Eng.).
190 Id. Note that the final wording of the Act closely parallels the recommenda-
tions made by the Advisory Committee. HEILBRON REPORT, supra note 167, at 14.
191 See J.A. Coutts, Developments in Recklessness, 48 J. CRIM. L. 87 (1984);
Alec Samuels, Consent: Rape, 127 SoLIrroRs J. 742 (1983). But see Simon Gard-
ner, Reckless and Inconsiderate Rape, 1991 CRIM. L. REV. 172 (1991) (arguing that
the Morgan decision was not the victory that subjective theorists claimed it to be).
192 For an explanation of specific intent versus general intent, see Lord Si-
mon's opinion. Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 362-67.
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above and beyond. . ." any general intent with respect to the
criminal act.193 By requiring specific intent, objective evidence
that the victim did not, in fact, consent to the intercourse would
not be sufficient for a conviction. Specific intent, in effect, forces
the prosecution to adduce evidence as to what was going on in
the defendant's mind.
Third, it sent the message that the legal rights of the ac-
cused were to be protected to a greater degree than the legal
rights of the victim in rape cases.194 The Morgan court's assess-
ment of criminal liability failed to appropriately consider the
subjective perceptions of the victim and the objective evidence
presented. A subjective standard of proof and classification of
rape as a specific intent crime will allow the legal rights of a
victim to fall through the cracks of the criminal justice system.
The Morgan decision is doctrinally flawed because it claims
to formulate a standard of mens rea in rape grounded in pure
legal theory. 195 Legal theory cannot exist in a vacuum.
Throughout the development of the criminal justice system, law
and morality have gone hand in hand. The evolution of legal
theory with regard to crime and punishment turns on what soci-
ety perceives as wrong. However, the Morgan court tries to
turn a blind eye to this when the court uses archaic societal per-
ceptions of rape to justify its theory. Further, the Morgan court
contradicts established legal theory by abandoning the reasona-
bleness requirement of a mistaken belief defense exclusively for
the offense of rape. 196 The Morgan court used a subjectivist the-
193 BLAcKs LAw DIcTIoNARY 1339 (6th 3d. 1990).
194 Lord Simon argues in the dissent that a reason for requiring a mistaken
belief to be reasonable is to strike a balance between the rights of the victim and
the rights of the accused. Id. at 367. "It would hardly seem just to fob off a victim
of a savage assault with such comfort as he could derive from knowing that his
injury was caused by a belief, however absurd, that he was about to attack the
accused." Id.
195 The majority asserts that its basis for a subjective standard of determining
mens rea is that the crime of rape differs from other types of crimes where a mis-
taken belief is required to be reasonable. See supra notes 116-65 and accompany-
ing text. However, the author submits that this line of legal reasoning cannot
stand on its own. Rather, the majority fashioned its legal theory around their in-
terpretation of the meaning of the word "rape" itself. When Lord Cross gave his
definition of rape, the Court had no choice but to read an additional mens rea re-
quirement into the offense of rape. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
196 In his opinion, Lord Edmund-Davies points to Tolson in setting forth gen-
eral principles embedded in criminal law:
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ory of intent in finding that an honest belief alone can act to
negate the mens rea in rape offenses. 197 Under this view, levels
of intent like "knowledge" and "recklessness" are used inconsis-
tently as standards for mental culpability. 198 While the subjec-
tivist approach couches recklessness in terms of risk and
foresight, it is difficult to define the Morgan court's use of the
term.199
Part of the problem in understanding the Morgan notion of
recklessness is the court's ordinary language definition of rape.
The court stated that a man who had intercourse with a woman
based on an inadequate belief in consent would not say that he
has committed rape.200 This line of reasoning reflects a tradi-
tionally masculine perception of rape. While a man who acts on
an unreasonable belief in consent will not believe that he has
committed rape, a woman who is subjected to the act of sexual
intercourse without her consent will believe that she has been
raped, regardless of the mental state of the aggressor.201 Be-
cause of the definition used by the House of Lords, it follows
that its characterization of mens rea and recklessness also re-
flects masculine perceptions.
The term "recklessness" within traditional subjectivist
thinking is outlined as encompassing several different states of
At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circum-
stances, which, if true, would make the act for which a prisoner is indicted
an innocent act has always been held to be a good defence. This doctrine is
embodied in the somewhat uncouth maxim, "actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea."
Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 377 (quoting Tolson, 58 L.J.R. at 105).
[A] mistake of facts on reasonable grounds, to the extent that, if the facts
were as believed, the acts of the prisoner would make him guilty of no of-
fence at all, is an excuse, and that such an excuse is implied in every crimi-
nal charge and every criminal enactment in England.
Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 377 (citing Tolson, 58 L.J.R. at 110). "[Tlhe absence of mens
rea really consists in an honest and reasonable belief entertained by the accused of
the existence of facts which, if true, would make the act charged against him inno-
cent." Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 377 (citing New South Wales v. Piper, [1897] A.C. 383,
389-90).
197 See generally Goode, supra note 115.
198 See Goode, supra note 115, at 467. For example, in Lord Hailsham's opin-
ion, he uses both of these words interchangeably to describe the requisite intent for
rape.
199 See Goode, supra note 115, at 467.
200 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
201 R.A. Duff, Recklessness and Rape, 3(2) LIvERPOOL L. REV. 49, 56 (1981).
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mind, which can be divided into four categories. 20 2 First, "[tihe
defendant realises that the woman may not be consenting but
hopes that she is."203 Second, "[t]he defendant realises that the
woman may not be consenting but is determined to have inter-
course with her regardless."20 4 Third, "[tihe defendant is so in-
tent on having intercourse with the woman, that although it
occurs to him that she may not be consenting, he suppresses the
thought, and deliberately closes his mind to the risk."20 5
Fourth, "[t]he defendant does not advert to the issue of consent
at all. His mind is a total blank."20 6
The Morgan holding only allows liability for recklessness
under the first three circumstances. 20 7 Under the fourth situa-
tion, the accused has no belief at all. The Morgan court rea-
soned that there must be some sort of positive belief in order for
any mens rea to exist at all.20 8
Further, there are to other two scenarios where the accused
would not be termed reckless under Morgan: "[tihe defendant
believes that the woman is consenting. It does not occur to him
that she might not be."20 9 In this situation, the man has a belief
in consent and does not consider the risk. Regardless of why he
has that belief, he does not consider that she may not consent.
Second, "[t]he defendant, having realised that the woman might
not be consenting, wrongly and quite unreasonably concludes
that she is."210 Here, the possibility of non-consent is in the.
202 Jennifer Temkin, The Limits of Reckless Rape, 1983 CRIM. L. REV. 5 (1983).
203 Id. In this situation, the man thinks that the woman may not be con-
senting, but wants the intercourse to be consensual and thus disregards the
thought.
204 Id. In this situation, the man thinks that the woman may not be con-
senting, but does not care. He will continue with the intercourse regardless of the
existence or absence of consent from the woman.
205 Id. In this situation, the man wants to have sex but knows that he
shouldn't unless the woman also wants to have sex. If he refuses to think about
the risk of non-consent, then it cannot subjectively exist.
206 Id. at 6. In this situation, the man gives absolutely no thought to the issue
of consent.
207 See Duff, supra note 201, at 53. Duff interprets Morgan as including "only
those who either know that she does not consent or suspect this and would persist
even if they knew it." Duff, supra note 201, at 53.
208 Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 352.
209 See Temkin, supra note 202, at 6.
210 Temkin, supra note 202, at 6.
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man's mind. However, his skewed perception of the circum-
stances lead him to believe that she is.
Allowing any of the above scenarios to defy criminal liabil-
ity is objectionable because each of them should be regarded as
instances of reckless conduct. Recklessness should not have to
involve an actual awareness of a risk that the woman does not
consent. 211 Sexual intercourse must be viewed as a "consensual
act between partners, both of whose interests are integrally in-
volved."212 The consent of the parties is essential; it is not a
contingent circumstance.21 3 When intercourse is viewed in this
light, inadvertence to the issue of consent or an unreasonable
belief in the existence of consent constitutes reckless conduct for
several reasons.
First, it is not acceptable to be mistaken about a woman's
consent because the essence of the sex act should derive from
"two actively interested participants in a mutually consensual
activity."214 The attitudes of the two parties with regard to sex-
ual intercourse defines the act and its boundaries. To argue
that one was mistaken as to consent or did not even think about
the issue shows a lack of regard for a woman's interest in the
sex act.
Second, in most situations of rape (like in Morgan), the lack
of consent is "objectively demonstrated"21 5 by either resistance,
express dissent, or other circumstances 21 6 that make it difficult
for the victim to resist.217 In these situations, the aggressor
acts in the face of objective evidence that the woman is not
consenting.21-8
Third, the mistake of belief in consent is essentially con-
nected to the sexual act itself.21 9 A claim that consent is only
contingently related to the act views women as a means to an
end, rather than a partner with an equal interest in the activ-
211 See generally, Duff, supra note 201, at 54.
212 Duff, supra note 201, at 56.
213 Duff, supra note 201, at 56.
214 Duff, supra note 201, at 58.
215 Duff, supra note 201, at 58 (quoting Lord Simon in Morgan).
216 These circumstances can include fraud, unconsciousness, bondage, or some
form of force or coercion against the victim. Duff, supra note 201, at 52-53.
217 Duff, supra note 201, at 58, 59.
218 Duff, supra note 201, at 59.
219 Duff, supra note 201, at 59.
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ity. When sexual relationships are viewed in this context, "any
account of the mens rea of rape must rest on an account of the
kind of attention a man should pay to, the kind of concern he
should have for, the woman's consent, and must thus express a
moral view about the proper nature of sexual relationships."220
In sum, the subjective standard used by the Morgan court
allows the criminal justice system to focus on the rights of the
accused, rather than the victim. The primary focus of rape laws
should be the protection of the victim's rights to bodily privacy
and retribution. In this light, the actions that result from inad-
vertence or an unreasonably held belief in consent are too viola-
tive to be attributed to any standard below recklessness. 221
The 'negligent rapist' who is intent on intercourse without attend-
ing to the possibility that the woman does not consent, or who is
prepared to take another's word, or his own preconceptions, as ad-
equate grounds for his belief in her consent, displays what must
be counted, on any proper moral view of the significance of her
consent, as a serious disregard for her consent and her sexual
interests.222
An objective standard of mens rea in rape would serve two
purposes. First, it would not allow inadvertence as to consent
or an unreasonable belief in consent to negate intent. Second, it
would allow an honestly held belief in consent based on reason-
able grounds to negate intent in situations where it may truly
not exist. The Morgan dissent argued for an objective standard
in evaluating a mistaken belief defense.223
Lord Simon wrote a dissenting opinion in Morgan.224 He
believed that the court was wrong in applying a subjective stan-
dard of proof to mens rea.225 Instead, he endorsed the objectiv-
220 Duff, supra note 201, at 59.
221 Duff, supra note 201, at 58; see generally Temkin, Towards a Modern Law
of Rape, 45 MODERN L. REv. 399 (1982).
222 See Duff, supra note 201, at 60-61.
223 Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 362-67. Note that this only deals with Lord Simon's
opinion. Lord Edmund-Davies, who also dissented, did not advocate an objective
standard but felt obligated to dissent based on existing precedent.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 365. Lord Simon argued that
[Piroof of sexual intercourse with a woman who did not consent to it - will
generally be sufficient prima facie proof to shift the evidential burden. If the
evidential burden shifts in this way, the accused must either prove that his
conduct was involuntary (which is irrelevant in the crime of rape) or he
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ist approach.226 He explained that crimes requiring some
standard of mens rea either involved a general or an ulterior
intent.227 If the mental element of the offense was attached to
the act itself, then only a basic intent was required. 228
Lord Simon disagreed with the majority and asserted that
rape was a basic intent crime. 229 With basic intent crimes, a
prima facie showing beyond a reasonable doubt that a certain
fact existed also acts to make a prima facie showing of intent.230
Therefore, once the prosecution puts forth sufficient evidence
that a woman did not consent, the evidentiary burden should
shift to the accused to negate or deny mens rea.23 1 This burden
could be met by a showing that the accused honestly manifested
a mistaken belief in consent that was based on reasonable
grounds.232
'The rationale of reasonable grounds for the mistaken belief must
lie in the law's consideration that a bald assertion of belief for
which the accused can indicate no reasonable ground is evidence
of insufficient substance to raise any issue requiring the jury's
consideration.' I agree; but I think there is also another reason.
The policy of the law in this regard could well derive from its con-
cern to hold a fair balance between the victim and the accused.233
The objective standard of proof for mens rea in rape pro-
tects the victim in several ways. First, it does not excessively
rely on what the defendant asserts was going on in his mind. It
allows any objective evidence of non-consent, as well as the vic-
must negative the inference as to mens rea which might be drawn from the
actus reus.
Id.
226 See Goode, supra note 115, at 501.
227 See Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 363-65. Basic intent crimes encompass those
"whose definition expresses . .. a mens rea which does not go beyond the actus
reus." Id. at 363. Crimes of ulterior intent require some type of mens rea beyond
the contemplation of the actus reus. Id. at 364.
228 See Goode, supra note 115, at 501. Lord Simon further explains that in a
basic intent crime, "[t]he actus reus generally consists of an act and some conse-
quence.., the mens rea does not extend beyond the act and its consequence, how-
ever remote, as defined in the actus reus." Morgan, 2 All E.R. at 363.
229 Goode, supra note 115, at 501.
230 Goode, supra note 115, at 501.
231 Goode, supra note 115, at 501.
232 Goode, supra note 115, at 501.
233 Morgan, 2 ADl E.R. at 367 (quoting Regina v. Morgan, 1 All E.R. 8, 14 (C.A.
1974)).
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tims perceptions, to be put in front of the jury. Second, it forces
the law to adapt to a broader view of equality in sexual relation-
ships by refusing to allow inadvertence as to consent or an un-
reasonable belief in consent as a defense. Third, it holds rapists
to a higher standard of culpability and provides a more just
scale of retribution.
However, the objective standard is also sufficient to safe-
guard the interests of the accused. The defendant will not be
convicted on the subjective hearsay of an accuser. The state
must meet a high burden of showing objective evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that the victim did not consent in order to
make a prima facie case for rape. If this cannot be established,
the case is automatically dismissed.
Thus, if there is enough objective evidence to show the vic-
tim did not consent, the objective approach provides for a de-
fense. If the defendant can show he had reasonable grounds for
believing in the victim's consent, the jury will acquit him. A
jury of his peers will decide what is reasonable by current socie-
tal standards. This standard is fair because it provides a de-
fense for certain circumstances of mistaken belief while
maintaining a societal check on the defendant's actions.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AFTER MfORGANV
The Morgan decision's attempt to clarify the use of the sub-
jective standard when determining the existence or absence of
mens rea for an offense was problematic. The House of Lords
intended this decision to apply as a broad principle of criminal
law. However, lower courts continued to require that an hon-
estly held mistaken belief be reasonable to afford a defense in
other areas of criminal law, applying Morgan only to rape
cases.234 To date, no court has explicitly overruled Morgan.235
The more recent trend of cases dealing with mens rea appear to
support Morgan. Nevertheless, there exists much confusion in
the way courts are interpreting and applying Morgan. The fol-
lowing progeny of cases shows that most courts dealing with the
234 See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
235 The holding in Morgan was codified by the Sexual Offences Act of 1976.
Sexual Offences Act, 1976, ch. 82, § 1 (Eng.). However the courts still refer to Mor-
gan for guidance as a common law case in understanding mens rea in rape and
subjective intent.
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issue of mens rea in rape view Morgan as a red herring, rather
than embracing it as a bright line rule.
Regina v. Cogan236 was another similar rape case decided
only a few months after Morgan. Here, defendant Cogan was
convicted of raping Leak's wife and defendant Leak was con-
victed of aiding and abetting the rape. 237 The circumstances
are similar to Morgan. Leak came home drunk one night and
asked his wife for money; she refused, and he attacked her.238
The next night he came home with Cogan. Both men were
drunk.239 Leak told his wife that Cogan wanted to have sex
with her, and that he would make sure it happened. 240 Leak
forced his wife to go upstairs and undress, whereby Leak and
Cogan both raped her.241 While Leak admitted that he had pro-
cured Cogan to sleep with his wife, Cogan maintained he be-
lieved Mrs. Leak consented. 242 The trial judge asked "the jury
to make a finding whether any belief in consent which Cogan
may have had was based on reasonable grounds."243
The jury convicted, saying that they felt Cogan had be-
lieved in Mrs. Leak's consent, but that the belief was not based
on reasonable grounds.244 On appeal, the court followed the
House of Lords reasoning in Morgan and reversed Cogan's con-
viction. Because the jury believed Cogan, he was allowed to go
free. Leak's conviction was sustained, because he had intended
for Cogan to rape his wife.245
236 2 All E.R. 1059 (1975). This decision consolidated two cases. Defendant
Leak was prosecuted in the same proceeding as Cogan.
237 Id. at 1060. While the facts show that Leak had also raped his wife, he was
only charged with aiding and abetting due to the marital rape exemption.
238_ Id. The evidence shows that the marriage was turbulent and marked by
bouts of violence. Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. Leak's statement to the police indicated that he set up his wife to be
raped "to punish her for past conduct." Id. at 1060-61.
241 Id. at 1060. Both Cogan and Leak admitted that Mrs. Leak had been cry-
ing and sobbing during the intercourse. Id. at 1060-61.
242 Id. at 1060-61. The basis for Cogan's belief was what Leak had told him.
Id. at 1061. At no time did he speak with Mrs. Leak about her feelings.
243 Id. This was in accordance with the Court of Appeals decision in Morgan.
Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 1062. This result is exactly what critics of Morgan feared would hap-
pen. Cogan, who in fact raped Mrs. Leak, did not bear any criminal responsibility
for his actions. While Leak himself was rightly convicted, it does not account for
Cogan's behavior, which was reckless. Ironically, the Court of Appeal explained
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In 1981, Regina v. Phekoo246 purported to keep the princi-
pies of Morgan confined strictly to rape. 24 7 This case involved a
landlord-tenant dispute. The defendant tried to kick the com-
plainants off the property and was subsequently convicted of
harassment. 248 On appeal, the defendant claimed he should not
be found guilty since he honestly believed the tenants were not
actual occupants, and that the trial judge erred in failing to in-
struct the jury as to this belief.249 The Court of Appeals agreed
that a specific intent to harass needed to be proved, but dis-
agreed with the defendant's contention that his intent should be
determined by a subjective standard.250 Instead, the court
found that when self-defense is asserted, a defendant has to
show he had reasonable grounds in his honest belief.251
The next case involving a significant discussion of mens rea
was Regina v. Caldwell.252 The defendant, in a drunken state,
set fire to a hotel after having a fight with the manager. 253 He
was convicted of arson under the Criminal Damage Act of 1971,
which stated that a person was guilty where he was "reckless as
to whether the life of another would thereby be endangered."254
In defining "reckless," the court stated that a person is reckless
if:
the injustice appropriately. "One fact is clear - the wife had been raped... [tihe
fact that Cogan was innocent of rape because he believed she was consenting does
not affect the position that she was raped." Id. at 1062.
246 1 W.L.R. 1117 (C.A. 1981).
247 Id. at 1127. In 1981, the Court of Appeal also declined to apply Morgan in
Albert v. Lavin, 1 All E.R. 628 (1975) (holding that in an assault case, it was not a
defense that the accused honestly but mistakenly believed that his action was jus-
tified as self-defense if there were no reasonable grounds for his belief).
248 Phekoo, 1 W.L.R. at 1119.
249 Id. at 1121. Defendant asserted that the trial judge erred in finding the
defendant's belief to be irrelevant. See id. at 1120-21.
250 See id. at 1127.
251 Id. at 1127-28. The court attempts to distinguish this case from Morgan in
two ways. First, it declares that the principles espoused in Morgan should be con-
fined to rape law. Id. at 1127. Second, it explained that this was a situation where
a mistaken belief would be considered a defense, rather than going to prove the
absence of an element of the offense (as was claimed in Morgan). Id. at 1128.
252 [1982] App. Cas. 341 (1981).
253 Id. at 343.
254 Id. The defendant had pleaded guilty to the first section of the Act, admit-
ting that he intended to destroy property, but maintained that he had no intent to
put people's lives in danger. Id.
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(1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that prop-
erty will be damaged or destroyed; and
(2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought as to
the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that
there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do
it.255
This definition of reckless differs significantly from the one
proposed in Morgan. The Caldwell definition finds culpability
in a defendant that has not given any thought to a situation, or
who has perceptions of his own act that do not conform with the
societal view. Under the Caldwell definition, a person is consid-
ered reckless if he did not give any thought to the surrounding
circumstances or if he realized the risk involved and acted any-
way. The Morgan standard would not have found mental culpa-
bility in those situations. However, the Caldwell definition has
not been explicitly extended to rape cases. Thus, defendants
who fit in the above categories may still be exempted from crim-
inal liability for rape.
The next case involving rape after Cogan to reach the ap-
pellate level was Regina v. Pigg.25 6 The victims in this case
were teenagers who had snuck away from sleepaway camp to
have a drink at a local bar.25 7 The defendant, posing as a camp
official, attacked the girls when they returned. 258 Subse-
quently, the defendant was indicted on one count of rape and
one count of attempted rape.259 At trial, the defendant main-
tained that a rape had not taken place because the complain-
ants had consented. 260
255 Id. at 354. The court also noted its dislike of the focus on subjective and
objective standards in recklessness, stating that "questions of criminal liability are
seldom solved by simply asking whether the test is subjective or objective." Id.
256 1 W.L.R. 762 (C.A. 1982). More accurately, Pigg is the next rape case dis-
cussing issues of mens rea. In 1981, the Court of Appeal decided Regina v.
Olugboja, 3 All E.R. 443 (1981) (dealing with the actus reus issue of whether it is
sufficient to prove that the victim did not, in fact consent, or if the element requires
a showing of force, fear of force, or fraud).
257 Pigg, 1 W.L.R. at 764.
258 Id. In describing the attack, the court said that the defendant grabbed one
of the girls by the throat and declared, "I'm the Yorkshire Ripper." Id. The defend-
ant then subjected the victims to "a catalogue of almost every sexual indignity of
which one can think." Id.
259 Id. at 763-64. The defendant was actually convicted of two counts of at-
tempted rape and one count of indecent assault. Id. at 764.
260 Id. at 765.
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In the jury instructions, the judge remarked "the prosecu-
tion had to prove either that the appellant knew the complain-
ants did not consent or he was reckless as to whether or not
they consented; and that a man was reckless if he was aware of
the possibility that the complainants might not be consenting
but nevertheless went ahead."261 The defendant was convicted,
but raised the issue on appeal that the judge misdirected the
jury as to the standard of recklessness. 262 In considering the
defendant's contentions, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not
rely extensively on the case law developed in Morgan.263 As a
result, the court came up with the following definition of
recklessness:
[A] man is reckless if either he was indifferent and gave no
thought to the possibility that the woman might not be consenting
in circumstances where if any thought had been given to the mat-
ter it would have been obvious that there was a risk she was not,
or, that he was aware of the possibility that she might not be con-
senting but nevertheless persisted regardless of whether she con-
sented or not.264
The appellate court's reasoning in Regina v. Kimber265 ex-
tended the principles of Morgan to indecent assault. In Kimber,
the defendant sexually assaulted a female patient in a mental
hospital.266 Although the alleged victim was mentally deficient,
the defendant claimed at trial that he believed the woman had
consented. 267 The trial judge directed the jury that the only is-
261 Id. at 768.
262 Id. at 767. The definition of rape that the defendant invited the court to
adopt was as follows: "[wlhere a man has sexual intercourse with a woman who
does not consent to it when he appreciates from the situation that a real risk exists
that she is not consenting and nonetheless carries on with the act." Id. at 769.
263 See generally id. at 770-72. The court did not use the Morgan definition of
reckless. Rather, the court looked at the Sexual Offences Act of 1976, Regina v.
Caldwell, [1982] App. Cas. at 341, and Regina v. Lawrence, 2 W.L.R. 524 (1981) in
determining whether the defendant was reckless.
264 Id. at 772. This was significant because it expanded the Morgan view of
recklessness to include a defendant who did not give any thought to the situation.
265 1 W.L.R. 1118 (CA. 1983).
266 Id. at 1120.
267 Id. at 1121. He also gave testimony that he was indifferent to the com-
plainant's feelings. Id.
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sue to consider was whether in fact the woman had consented,
and that the defendant's belief was not a defense. 268
Defendant appealed, contending that the issue for the jury
was whether he honestly believed that she consented.26 9 The
state conceded that the trial judge's instructions were incorrect,
but argued that the issue should be whether the defendant's be-
liefs were reasonable. 270 The Court of Appeals found that, tech-
nically, the jury was misdirected by the trial court's instructions
because the jury was not left to consider the issue of whether
the defendant had a genuine belief in consent. 27' However, the
court upheld the conviction because it felt that since the defend-
ant had admitted he was indifferent to the complainant's feel-
ings, no jury would have found that he had an honest belief in
consent.272
Later in 1983, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided the
case of Regina v. Satnam.273 In Satnam, the defendants were
convicted of raping a thirteen year old girl.274 Again, the de-
fendants claimed the victim consented.275 On appeal, they con-
tended that the judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the
mental element of recklessness. 276 The trial judge instructed
the jury that with respect to the element of recklessness, it was
a risk "obvious to an ordinary observer" that the girl was not
consenting.277 In overturning the convictions, the Court of Ap-
peals showed some support for Morgan, finding that the judge's
268 Id. In this case, the trial judge was concerned with actus reus, not mens
rea.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1123.
272 Id. This is similar to what the House of Lords did in Morgan. Rather than
applying the principles they extended, the court upheld a conviction because a mis-
carriage of justice was not done.
273 78 Cr. App. 149 (1983).
274 Id. at 150. One of the defendants was a co-worker of the victim. He offered
to give her a ride to work the day the attack took place. Id.
275 Id. at 151. When the defendants were interviewed by police, Satnam said
the following, "[blut when I tried to have sex Kewal held her arms down because
she pushed me away... I am very sorry for what I have done. Elizabeth never
asked for sex; we took advantage of her, but Kewal is strong - she couldn't stop
him." Id.
276 Id. at 151.
277 Id.
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failure to instruct as to an honest belief was inadequate. 278
However, the court did admit confusion in applying reckless-
ness after the Pigg, Caldwell, and Lawrence decisions. On
these grounds, the defendants went free.
In Regina v. Taylor,279 the appellate court added a new
twist to the existing law. The trial judge in Taylor refused to
give a jury instruction regarding an honest but mistaken belief
in consent, 280 giving the defendant a basis for appeal. On this
issue, the court announced that "there is no general require-
ment that such a direction should be directed in all cases of
rape."28 ' The court found the evidence did not warrant a direc-
tion as to an honest belief in consent. 28 2 Rather, the court rea-
soned that the facts did not support this contention. 28 3 Further,
the court opined that a jury would have convicted him anyway
and the failure to give the instruction was harmless error.2 4
Almost twenty years after Morgan, the law regarding rape
remains inconsistent. The courts in Great Britain have failed to
articulate a legal premise explaining whether or not the mens
rea in rape is different from that of other offenses, and if so,
why. The reluctance of the court to change the law shows a lack
278 Id. at 152. Although they found the jury instructions to be inadequate, it
did not agree with the defendant's contention that the judge should have in-
structed the jury that for recklessness, the prosecution had to prove that each de-
fendant was actually aware of the possibility that the victim was not consenting.
See id. at 154-55.
279 80 Cr. App. 327 (1984).
280 Id. at 330.
281 Id. The court maintained that the nature of the evidence would determine
whether such a direction would be appropriate. Id. at 330-31.
282 See id. at 331.
283 Id. at 332. The court felt that once the jury decided that the complainant
was telling the truth, there was not much room for an honest but mistaken belief
by the defendant. Id.
284 Id. There are two final rape cases in the Morgan progeny. First, Regina v.
Fotheringham, [1989] 88 Cr. App. 206 (1988). This case dealt with an aspect of
mens rea not dealt with in Morgan - self-intoxication. Defendant was convicted of
raping his children's 14 year old babysitter. He claimed that he was so drunk at
the time, he thought he was having sex with his wife. The jurors were instructed
to ask themselves whether there were reasonable grounds for the defendant to
believe that he was having sex with his wife. Id. at 209. The defendant appealed,
and the court dismissed the case, holding that self-induced intoxication did not
provide a mistaken belief defense, reasonable or not. Id. at 212.
Second, Regina v. Khan, 1 W.L.R. 813 (CA. 1990) (dismissing the appeals of
three defendants convicted of the attempted rape of a sixteen year old and holding
that the same principles apply to both rape and attempted rape).
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of understanding that its aim should be to serve the broader
interests of modern society by protecting a victims' rights to pri-
vacy, bodily integrity, and retribution for the crime committed.
The law of rape in the past existed for the protection of
property rights, rather than for the protection of women.28 5
Historically, redress for the crime of rape was monetary com-
pensation for the theft of another man's property.28 6 The pun-
ishment has changed, but the argument can still be made that
rape law does not exist for the protection of women.287 The cur-
rent law reflects the attitude that it is better to preserve the
reputation of an accused man then to have the rights of the vic-
tim vindicated. 288
VI. CONCLUSION
In sex crimes against women, particularly rape, there con-
tinues to be a stagnating attitude towards recognizing the
rights of women's safety and bodily integrity under the law.
Although there has been some progress, there is still not an ad-
equate reflection of equality under the law in the protection
against sex crimes. Morgan and its progeny have failed the vic-
tims of rape in many ways. The rape victim is unsure of how
she stands under the law, because the standards for proving the
mens rea of her attacker remain indecisive, impractical and
unfair.
First, it is a mistake to classify rape as a specific intent of-
fense. The actus reus of rape should be sexual intercourse with
a person who is not, in fact, consenting. If the prosecution can
show that the intercourse was intentional, then the mens rea
should be satisfied. It is impossible to distinguish between
crimes where evidence of mens rea goes to an element of the
offense as opposed to a defense at law. The issue of what
amounts to proof of mens rea by the prosecution remains uncer-
tain. Allowing a defendant to put forth evidence of mistaken
belief as to the circumstances to show that the prosecution has
not proved mens rea only provides an additional handicap.
28 Temkin, supra note 221, at 401.
286 Temkin, supra note 221, at 400-01.
287 Id.
2 See generally Temkin, supra note 221, at 282.
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Second, the subjective standard for determining mens rea
forces the prosecution to adduce what is going on in the defend-
ant's mind. What the subjective standard does, in essence, is
bring all of the evidence down to the issue of credibility. If the
defendant testifies and his beliefs seem plausible, a jury is
likely to acquit him, because only he can really explain what is
going on in his mind. This is the wrong way to approach mens
rea in rape. Sex carries with it a high degree of responsibility.
There is nothing wrong in holding a person accountable for his
actions by requiring that they are reasonable. An objective
standard of proof for mens rea in sex offenses is the best way to
bring about a balance between the rights of the accused and the
rights of the victim.
Third, the definition of reckless rape varies from case to
case. It remains unclear as to what state of mind must exist for
a person to be reckless. Using an objective standard for deter-
mining mens rea would act to alleviate this problem. It is a fair
proposition to have the standard of recklessness in a particular
situation measured by the standards of a reasonable person.
Otherwise, cases of rape that do not show a knowledge of lack of
consent or at least indifference will fall through the cracks of
the system. These should not be the only situations where a
rapist can be seen as criminally culpable.
Finally, a definition of rape as a basic intent crime, along
with an objective standard for determining mens rea and a
broader view of recklessness will help to bridge the gap between
the protections afforded to a defendant and the rights of the vic-
tim in rape cases. It is a unique crime in that the physical, psy-
chological and social consequences suffered by the victim are
overwhelming. The dichotomy between the male and female
perceptions of rape must be brought together to reflect a more
balanced view of rape. There are situations where a person who
gives no thought to whether or not a woman is consenting dur-
ing intercourse is reckless. There are situations where the in-
dignities suffered by the victim require that retribution and
punishment be a significant goal in prosecution.
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